กŒใ‚ฬ—\’่i2020”N2ŒŽ`4ŒŽj

ƒe[ƒ}: Machine Learning and Mechanism Design

 

Reading Lists (Tentative)

 

Dutting, Feng, Golowich, Narasimhan, Parkes, and Ravindranath. 2019. gMachine Learning for Optimal Economic Design.h in Future of Economic Design (ed.by Laslier)

Dutting, Feng, Narasimhan, Parkes, Ravindranath. 2019. gOptimal Auctions through Deep Learning.

Fudenberg and Liang. 2019. gPredicting and Understanding Initial Play.h AER.

Fudenberg, Kleinberg, Liang, Mullainathan. 2019. gMeasuring the Completeness of Theories.h

Kevin Leyton-Brown, Milgrom, and Segal. 2017. gEconomics and Computer Science of a Radio Spectrum Reallocation.h PNAS.

Milgrom and Tadelis. 2019. gHow Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design.h NBER.

Newman, Leyton-Brown, Milgrom, and Segal. 2018. gAssessing Economic Outcomes in Simulated Reverse Clock Auctions for Radio Spectrum.h

Sandholm. 2019. gAutomated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms.h

 

‘ๆ53‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i2020jF

E4ŒŽ4“๚9Žž`18Žž

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P‚OFj

Dutting, Feng, Golowich, Narasimhan, Parkes, and Ravindranath. 2019. gMachine Learning for Optimal Economic Design.h in Future of Economic Design (ed.by Laslier)

‰œ‘บ‹ฑ•ฝ

Dutting, Feng, Narasimhan, Parkes, Ravindranath. 2019. gOptimal Auctions through Deep Learning.

•y“cเ Žu

Sandholm. 2019. gAutomated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms.h

ผ‰บ’U

 

‘ๆ54‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i2020jF

E4ŒŽ11“๚9Žž`18Žž

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P‚OFj

Fudenberg and Liang. 2019. gPredicting and Understanding Initial Play.h AER.

•ฝ‘๒r•F

Fudenberg, Kleinberg, Liang, Mullainathan. 2019. gMeasuring the Completeness of Theories.h

ฌ—ั‰๋“T

 

‘ๆ55‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i2020jF

E4ŒŽ18“๚9Žž`18Žž

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P‚OFj

Kevin Leyton-Brown, Milgrom, and Segal. 2017. gEconomics and Computer Science of a Radio Spectrum Reallocation.h PNAS.

Milgrom and Tadelis. 2019. gHow Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design.h NBER.

Newman, Leyton-Brown, Milgrom, and Segal. 2018. gAssessing Economic Outcomes in Simulated Reverse Clock Auctions for Radio Spectrum.h

 

@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@

I—น‚ต‚ฝ‰๏‡

 

ƒ~ƒNƒŒoฯŠwEƒQ[ƒ€—˜_Œค‹†‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E2ŒŽ2“๚16Žž15•ช`17Žž30•ช

‹ž“s‘ๅŠwŒoฯŒค‹†Š–{Šู1ŠK‰๏‹cŽบ

Matsushima, H.: gEfficient Combinatorial Exchanges,h 2011.

•๑ŽาFผ“‡ฤi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ1‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E2ŒŽ9“๚10Žž30•ช`12Žž30•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P‚OFj

Ulku, L. (ITAM): gOptimal Combinatorial Auction Designh, mimeo, 2011

Edelman, B. and M. Schwarz: gOptimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions,h AER, May 2010

•๑ŽาF”๖ŽR‘ๅ•ใi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ2‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E2ŒŽ16“๚10Žž30•ช`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚Q‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P‚QFj

Cramton, P. gSpectrum Auction Designh 2009.

•๑ŽาF”๖ŽR‘ๅ•ใi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ3‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E2ŒŽ24“๚‹เ—j‚P‚RŽž30•ช`1‚UŽž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P‚QFj

gOn UK Ofcom 2.6 GHz Auctionh

Jewitt, I. and Z. Li, gReport on the 2008 UK 10-40 GHz Spectrum Auctionh 2008

Cramton, P. gA Review of the 10-40 GHz Auctionh 2008

Cramton, P. gA Review of the L-band Auctionh 2008

•๑ŽาFฒ–์—ฒŽii‘ๅใ‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ4‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E3ŒŽ2“๚‹เ—j‚P‚RŽž30•ช`1‚UŽž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P0Fj

gOn Japan 4G License Product Designh

•๑ŽาFˆภ“c—m—SiGRIPSj

 

International Conference on Applied Microeconomics and Development Economics (2012)

E3ŒŽ17“๚10Žž20•ช`11Žž40•ช

‹ž“s‘ๅŠw

Matsushima, H.: gEfficient Combinatorial Exchanges,h 2011.

•๑ŽาFผ“‡ฤi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ5‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E‚RŒŽ‚Q‚V“๚‰ฮ—j‚P‚RŽž30•ช`1‚UŽž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P0Fj

u“๚–{‚S‚f“d”gƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“Œvˆฤv

•๑ŽาFผ“‡ฤi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ6‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E‚SŒŽ‚U“๚‹เ—j‚P0Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P0Fj

u“๚–{‚S‚f“d”gƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“ŒvˆฤvDiscussion 2

 

ƒ}ƒCƒNƒƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒvi‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E4ŒŽ10“๚16Žž40•ช`18Žž20•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศฌ“‡ƒz[ƒ‹ƒZƒ~ƒi[Žบi‚PFj

Matsushima, H.: gJapanese Package Auction Format (JP): Practical Design for 4G Spectrum Allocation in Japan,h 2012

•๑ŽาFผ“‡ฤi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ7‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E‚SŒŽ13“๚‹เ—j‚P0Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P0Fj

u“๚–{‚S‚f“d”gƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“ŒvˆฤvDiscussion 3

 

ƒ}ƒCƒNƒƒ[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒbƒvi‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E4ŒŽ17“๚16Žž40•ช`18Žž20•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศฌ“‡ƒz[ƒ‹ƒZƒ~ƒi[Žบi‚PFj

Sano, R. gThe Vickrey-Target Strategy and the Core in Ascending Combinatorial Auctionsh, mimeo, 2012

•๑ŽาFฒ–์—ฒŽii‘ๅใ‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ8‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E‚SŒŽ20“๚‹เ—j‚P0Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P0Fj

u“๚–{‚S‚f“d”gƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“ŒvˆฤvDiscussion 4

•๑ŽาF”๖ŽR‘ๅ•ใi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ9‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E‚SŒŽ27“๚‹เ—j‚P0Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi‚P0Fj

u“๚–{‚S‚f“d”gƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“ŒvˆฤvDiscussion 5

•๑ŽาFˆภ“c—m—Si‚f‚q‚h‚o‚rjA‘ผ

 

‘ๆ10‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E5ŒŽ11“๚‹เ—j‚P0Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

u“๚–{‚S‚f“d”gƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“ŒvˆฤvDiscussion 6

•๑ŽาF–๖์”อ”Vi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

uŽ”g”ƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“‚ษ‚จ‚ฏ‚้“Kณ‚ศŽx•ฅŠzFŠ—LŒ ‚ฦ‹ค–d‚ฬŠฯ“_‚ฉ‚็v

•๑ŽาFผ“‡ฤi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ11‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E5ŒŽ18“๚‹เ—j‚P0Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

u“๚–{‚S‚f“d”gƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“ŒvˆฤvDiscussion 6

•๑ŽาF–๖์”อ”Vi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

u—D‹๖‘[’u‚ศ‚วiKwerel, Cramton, et al (2011)v

•๑ŽาF‘O์~i‰@ถj

 

‘ๆ12‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E5ŒŽ24“๚–ุ—j‚VŽž`10Žž00•ชiŽžŠิ•ฯX‚ล‚ทj

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

u“๚–{‚S‚f“d”gƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“ŒvˆฤF”z•zŽ‘—ฟ‚ศ‚ว์ฌvDiscussion 7

•๑ŽาF–๖์”อ”Vi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

u—D‹๖‘[’u‚ศ‚วv‘ฑ‚ซ

•๑ŽาFˆภ“c—m—Si‚f‚q‚h‚o‚rjA”n๊A‘O์A‹v•“ci‰@ถj

 

‘ๆ13‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E6ŒŽ1“๚‹เ—j10Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศCARFƒgƒŒ[ƒfƒBƒ“ƒOƒ‰ƒ{i‚SFj๊Š•ฯX’ˆำI

u“๚–{‚S‚f“d”gƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“ŒvˆฤF”z•zŽ‘—ฟ‚ศ‚ว์ฌvDiscussion 7

•๑ŽาF–๖์”อ”Vi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

ƒpƒCƒƒbƒgŽภŒฑ“ฎ์Šm”F‚ศ‚ว

’S“–ŽาF”n๊A‹v•“ci‰@ถj

 

‘ๆ14‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E6ŒŽ8“๚‹เ—j10Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศCARFƒgƒŒ[ƒfƒBƒ“ƒOƒ‰ƒ{i‚SFj๊Š•ฯX’ˆำI

ƒpƒCƒƒbƒgŽภŒฑ“ฎ์Šm”F‚ศ‚วi‘ฑ‚ซj

’S“–ŽาF‹v•“ci‰@ถj

 

‘ๆ15‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E6ŒŽ22“๚‹เ—j10Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

u‰H“c‹๓`”ญ’…˜gŠ„‚่“–‚ฤv1‰๑–ฺ

•๑ŽาF–๖์”อ”Vi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ16‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E6ŒŽ29“๚‹เ—j10Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

u‰H“c‹๓`”ญ’…˜gŠ„‚่“–‚ฤFƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“Œvˆฤv

•๑Fผ“‡ฤi“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠwj

 

‘ๆ17‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E7ŒŽ6“๚‹เ—j10Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศƒgƒŒ[ƒfƒBƒ“ƒOƒ‰ƒ{i‚SFj

u‰H“c‹๓`”ญ’…˜gŠ„‚่“–‚ฤv

Discussion‚จ‚ๆ‚ัŽภŒฑ€”๕i‹v•“cนKi‰@ถjj‚ศ‚ว

 

‘ๆ18‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E7ŒŽ20“๚‹เ—j10Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ4‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

u‰H“c‹๓`”ญ’…˜gŠ„‚่“–‚ฤv

Discussion

 

‘ๆ19‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E8ŒŽ3“๚‹เ—j10Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ3‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

u‰H“c‹๓`”ญ’…˜gŠ„‚่“–‚ฤv

Discussion‚ศ‚ว

 

‘ๆ20‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E8ŒŽ13“๚ŒŽ—j‚XŽž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

u“๚–{‚S‚f“d”gƒI[ƒNƒVƒ‡ƒ“ŒvˆฤvDiscussion 7

Discussion‚ศ‚ว

 

‘ๆ21‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Qj

E8ŒŽ24“๚‹เ—j10Žž`13Žž00•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

u‰H“c‹๓`”ญ’…˜gŠ„‚่“–‚ฤv

Discussion‚ศ‚ว

 

‘ๆ22‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Uj

E7ŒŽ9“๚“y—j10Žž`13Žž30•ช

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Kamenica, E., and M. Gentzkow (2011): gBayesian Persuasion,h American Economic Review 101, 2590-2615.

•๑ŽาF‹{‰บซ‹I

 

‘ๆ23‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Uj

E‚VŒŽ‚P‚X“๚‰ฮ—j‚XF‚O‚O`‚SF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Ely, J. (2016): Beeps, mimeo.

•๑ŽาF’ฉŒฉˆบŽŸ˜Y

 

‘ๆ2‚S‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Uj

E8ŒŽ4“๚–ุ—j13F‚O‚O`19F‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Sannikov, Y. (2008): gA Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problemh, R. E. Stud.

SADZIK, T. and E. STACCHETTIi2015j: gAGENCY MODELS WITH FREQUENT ACTIONS,h Econometrica.

•๑ŽาFผ‘บ—I—ข

 

‘ๆ2‚T‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Uj

E9ŒŽ3“๚“y—j‚XF‚O‚O`‚SF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Sannikov, Y. (2007): gGames with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time,h Econometrica

•๑ŽาF‹{‰บซ‹I

 

‘ๆ26‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Uj

E9ŒŽ4“๚“๚—j‚P‚QF‚O‚O`‚TF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Sannikov, Y. (2007): gGames with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time,h Econometricai‘O‰๑‚ฬ‘ฑ‚ซj

•๑ŽาF‹{‰บซ‹I

 

‘ๆ27‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Uj

E10ŒŽ8“๚“y—j‚XF‚O‚O`‚SF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Lambert and Horner (2016): gMotivational Rating,h mimeo.

•๑ŽาF’†“c—ขŽu

Kremer, Mansour, and Perry (2014): gImplementing the gWisdom of the Crowdh,h JPE.

•๑ŽาF•ะŽR—Rซ

 

‘ๆ28‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Uj

E11ŒŽ6“๚i“๚—jj10F00`16F00

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Frazier, Kempe, Kleinberg and Kleinberg (2014): "Incentivizing Exploration"

•๑ŽาF•ะŽR—Rซ

28th AMF Meeting, Nov 6, 2016 (U. Tokyo, Econ. 10F, Room 4)

Frazier, Kempe, Kleinberg and Kleinberg (2014): "Incentivizing Exploration," Reporter: Katayama

 

‘ๆ29`35‰๑F

‚` Second Course in Algorithm (Tim Roughgarden)

http://theory.stanford.edu/~tim/w16/w16.html

 

‘ๆ29‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Uj

E12ŒŽ4“๚“y—j‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚SF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Tim Roughgarden (2016) g‚` Second Course in Algorithmh

Ch.1,2,3

•๑ŽาF’ฉŒฉAฌ“cŒด

29th AMF Meeting : Tim Roughgarden (2016) g‚` Second Course in Algorithmh Ch.1,2,3: Reporters, Asami (1,2), Odahara (3)

 

‘ๆ30‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Uj

E12ŒŽ17“๚“y—j‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚SF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Tim Roughgarden (2016) g‚` Second Course in Algorithmh

Ch.3.4.

•๑ŽาF’ฉŒฉAฌ“cŒดA’†“c

30th AMF Meeting : Tim Roughgarden (2016) g‚` Second Course in Algorithmh Ch.3,4: Reporters, Asami, Odahara, Nakada

 

‘ๆ31‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Vj

E1ŒŽ7“๚“y—j‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚RF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Tim Roughgarden (2016) g‚` Second Course in Algorithmh

Ch.4,5,6,7.8.9

•๑ŽาF’†“cA•ะŽRA“ŒAผ‘บ

31th AMF Meeting : Tim Roughgarden (2016) g‚` Second Course in Algorithmh Ch.4,5,6,7,8,9: Reporters, Nakada, Katarama, Higashi, Matsumura

 

‘ๆ32‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Vj

E1ŒŽH“๚H—j‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚SF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Tim Roughgarden (2016) g‚` Second Course in Algorithmh

Ch.10,11,12

•๑ŽาF‰œ‘บA–ข’่

 

‘ๆ33‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Vj

E1ŒŽH“๚H—j‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚SF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Tim Roughgarden (2016) g‚` Second Course in Algorithmh

Ch.13,14,15

•๑ŽาF–ข’่

 

‘ๆ34‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Vj

E2ŒŽH“๚H—j‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚SF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Tim Roughgarden (2016) g‚` Second Course in Algorithmh

Ch.16,17,18

•๑ŽาF–ข’่

 

‘ๆ35‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Vj

E2ŒŽH“๚H—j‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚SF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Tim Roughgarden (2016) g‚` Second Course in Algorithmh

Ch.19,20‚จ‚ๆ‚ั‘ล‚ฟใ‚ฐ

•๑ŽาF–ข’่

 

‘ๆ36‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Wj

E‚PŒŽ‚U“๚i“y—jj‚P‚RF‚O‚O`‚P‚VF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Li, Shengwu. (2017): gObvious Strategy-Proof Mechanisms,h American Economic Review.

•๑ŽาFLIU, Xinyu

Esponda, Ignacio, and Emanuel Vespa. 2016. gContingent Preferences and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic Anomalies in the Laboratory.h working paper.

•๑ŽาFŠโฃ—S‰๎

 

‘ๆ37‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Wj

E‚PŒŽ20“๚i“y—jj‚P‚RF‚O‚O`‚P‚VF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Li, Shengwu. (2017): gObvious Strategy-Proof Mechanisms,h American Economic Review. (Continued)

•๑ŽาF‰œ‘บ‹ฑ•ฝ

Esponda, Ignacio, and Emanuel Vespa. 2016. gContingent Preferences and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic Anomalies in the Laboratory.h working paper.

•๑ŽาFŠโฃ—S‰๎

 

‘ๆ38‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Wj

E‚PŒŽ27“๚i“y—jj‚P‚RF‚O‚O`‚P‚VF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Li, Shengwu. (2017): gObvious Strategy-Proof Mechanisms,h American Economic Review. (Continued again)

•๑ŽาF‰œ‘บ‹ฑ•ฝ

Esponda, Ignacio, and Emanuel Vespa. 2016. gContingent Preferences and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic Anomalies in the Laboratory.h working paper.

•๑ŽาFŠโฃ—S‰๎

 

‘ๆ39‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Wj

E2ŒŽ10“๚i“y—jj‚P‚RF‚O‚O`‚P‚VF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Esponda, Ignacio, and Emanuel Vespa. 2016. gContingent Preferences and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic Anomalies in the Laboratory.h working paper.iContinuedj

•๑ŽาFŠโฃ—S‰๎

Akbarpour, M., Shengwu Li (17): gCredible Mechanism Design.h mimeo.

•๑ŽาFฌ“cŒด—I˜N

Eyster, Erik, and Matthew Rabin. 2005. gCursed equilibrium.h Econometrica, 73(5): 1623–1672.

•๑ŽาF‰อŒดŒ’Žu

 

‘ๆ40‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Wj

E2ŒŽ17“๚i“y—jj‚P‚RF‚O‚O`‚P‚VF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Esponda, Ignacio. 2008. gBehavioral equilibrium in economies with adverse selection.h The American Economic Review, 98(4): 1269–1291.

•๑ŽาF‰œ‘บ‹ฑ•ฝ

Jehiel, Philippe. 2005. gAnalogy-based expectation equilibrium.h Journal of Economic theory, 123(2): 81–104.

•๑ŽาF–ข’่

 

‘ๆ41‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚XjFƒuƒƒbƒNƒ`ƒF[ƒ“

E1ŒŽ13“๚i“๚—jj‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚P‚RF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Nakamoto, S. (2008): "Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system."

Böhme, R., N. Christin, B. Edelman, and T. Moore (2015): gBitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance.h Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(2): 213–238.

•๑ŽาF‰œ‘บ‹ฑ•ฝ

 

‘ๆ42‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚XjFƒuƒƒbƒNƒ`ƒF[ƒ“

E1ŒŽ13“๚i“๚—jj‚P‚SF‚O‚O`‚P‚VF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Biais, B., C. Bisiere, M. Bouvard, and C. Casamatta (2017): "The Blockchain Folk Theorem."

•๑ŽาF•y“cเ Žu

 

‘ๆ43‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚XjFƒuƒƒbƒNƒ`ƒF[ƒ“

E1ŒŽ14“๚iŒŽ—jj‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚P‚RF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Biais, B., C. Bisiere, M. Bouvard, and C. Casamatta (2017): "The Blockchain Folk Theorem."i‘ฑ‚ซj

•๑ŽาF•ฝ‘๒r•F

 

‘ๆ44‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚XjFƒuƒƒbƒNƒ`ƒF[ƒ“

E1ŒŽ26“๚i“y—jj‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚P‚RF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ2‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi12Fj

Huberman, G., J. D. Leshno, and C. Moallemi (2017): "Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System."

•๑ŽาFฌ“cŒด—I˜N

 

‘ๆ45‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚XjFƒuƒƒbƒNƒ`ƒF[ƒ“

E1ŒŽ26“๚i“y—jj‚P‚SF‚O‚O`‚P‚VF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ2‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi12Fj

Cong, L. W. and Z. He (2017): gBlockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts.h

•๑ŽาFฒ“ก—F—บ

 

‘ๆ46‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚XjFƒuƒƒbƒNƒ`ƒF[ƒ“

E1ŒŽ27“๚i“๚—jj‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚P‚RF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Abadi, J. and M. Brunnermeier (2018): gBlockchain Economicsh.

•๑ŽาF‹g์ A‰อŒดŒ’Žu

 

‘ๆ47‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚XjFƒuƒƒbƒNƒ`ƒF[ƒ“

E1ŒŽ27“๚i“๚—jj‚P‚SF‚O‚O`‚P‚VF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Abadi, J. and M. Brunnermeier (2018): gBlockchain Economicshi‘ฑ‚ซj

•๑ŽาF‹g์ A‰อŒดŒ’Žu

 

‘ๆ48‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚XjFƒuƒƒbƒNƒ`ƒF[ƒ“

E2ŒŽ3“๚i“๚—jj‚P‚OF‚O‚O`‚P‚RF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Budish, E. (2018): "The economic limits of bitcoin and the blockchain."

•๑ŽาF“Œ˜aŽu

 

‘ๆ49‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚XjFƒuƒƒbƒNƒ`ƒF[ƒ“

E2ŒŽ3“๚i“๚—jj‚P‚SF‚O‚O`‚P‚VF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Saleh, F. (2018): "Blockchain Without Waste: Proof-of-Stake."

•๑ŽาF’ฉŒฉˆบ“๑˜Y

Gui, G., A. Hortaçsu, and J. Tudón (2018): "A Memo on the Proof-of-Stake Mechanism."

•๑ŽาFฌ—ั‰๋“T

Saleh, F. (2018): "Volatility and Welfare in a Crypto Economy."

•๑ŽาF“Œ˜aŽu

 

‘ๆ50‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Xj

E6ŒŽ1“๚i“y—jj‚P‚RF‚O‚O`‚P‚WF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Bergemann and Bonatti (2019): gMarket for Information: An Introduction.h

•๑ŽาF’ฉŒฉˆบ“๑˜Y

 

‘ๆ51‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Xj

E6ŒŽ8“๚i“๚—jj‚P‚RF‚O‚O`‚P‚WF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Emir Kamenica (2018): gBayesian persuasion and information designh

•๑ŽาF•ฝ‘๒r•F

 

‘ๆ52‰๑ƒƒJƒjƒYƒ€ƒfƒUƒCƒ“•ื‹ญ‰๏i‚Q‚O‚P‚Xj

E6ŒŽ16“๚i“๚—jj‚P‚RF‚O‚O`‚P‚WF‚O‚O

“Œ‹ž‘ๅŠw‘ๅŠw‰@ŒoฯŠwŒค‹†‰ศ‘ๆ‚S‹ค“ฏŒค‹†Žบi10Fj

Weyl and Zhang (2018): gDepreciating Licenses.h

•๑ŽาF‰ช‘บ‹ฑ•ฝ